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Recommendations for Human Recovery: 
Case Management, Mental Health, Non Profits 
 
Pamela Jenkins, Branda Nowell, and Michelle Gremillion 
 
Since August 2005, individuals and families in the Gulf Coast area face enormous challenges to 
recovery. After a catastrophe, individuals and families have to build back nearly every facet of 
their lives. The multi-dimensionality of their recovery involves a myriad of resources: housing, 
health care, employment, schools, and day care. Housing remains central to recovery.  While this 
section of the report does not include specific recommendations about housing, the need for 
housing and the issues of rebuilding are intertwined with all of the recovery issues. In this 
section we discuss recommendations for the management of the human recovery. Specifically, 
we outline recommendations for case management after a catastrophe, ongoing mental health 
issues that arise in a long term recovery and the role of non profits (both national and 
international) in recovery.  These topics all address human recovery in some fashion and are 
related; yet, we approach each topic as a single issue.  While these are not nearly all the 
dimensions of human recovery, they represent a sample of the complexity of issues involved in 
the management of long-term human recovery. 
Disaster Case Management 
Prior to the response to Hurricane Katrina, very little disaster case management was documented 
or significantly funded (Phillips, 2009). The following recommendations highlight the role of the 
federal government in managing lives after a catastrophe. Effective disaster case management 
can expedite recovery and provide relief to disaster victims. Fragmented, underfunded disaster 
case management can hinder recovery and be a source of further stress to disaster victims. The 
emergent theme in this discussion is the tension between having a federal plan and including 
local agencies and knowledge. 
 1.  Connecting With the People Who Need Help 
Issue:  Information about evacuees and their situation (location, health, housing, transportation) 
was difficult to obtain. Further, a lack of coordination among case management providers 
resulted in some victims not receiving case management services and others receiving services 
from multiple agencies. As a result, agencies spent countless hours creating their own databases 
and some individuals in need of assistance were not helped. This is in part because “FEMA has 
no method for tracking clients and clients voluntarily contact FEMA to provide updated 
information” (GAO, July 2009, p. 19). 
The tension revolved around national, state and local access.  “Requests by the state for 
information should not get stuck in agency headquarters, where legal teams debate privacy issues 





and the state‟s right to the data. Local governments must have access to this information to 
ensure their ability to meet ongoing client needs when federal disaster assistance programs end” 
(Guma, 2009, p. 5).  
Recommendations: 
1a.  Best practices for coordination are defined by collaborative strategies which include 
policies, procedures, and other methods for communicating and working across 
multiple agencies and jurisdictions.  
1b.  The process of requesting and receiving program/client data from federal partners 
must be planned for in advance. As some case data now exists, it might be possible 
to maintain those networks built during Katrina. In the future, data management 
should have necessary resources. 
Rationale: Because of the chaos surrounding such a catastrophic event, it was difficult to find 
evacuees or know which program they qualified for. Outreach to evacuees was inconsistent 
across the country, especially in flood ravaged areas. 
2.  Navigating Without a Map 
Issue:  Initial confusion about funding and purpose of case management programs delayed local 
case management development.  Local agencies had difficulty knowing the parameters of the 
case management system, which hindered their participation.  “Disaster Case Management is a 
time-limited process by which a skilled helper partners with a disaster affected individual or 
family in order to plan for and achieve realistic goals for recovery following a disaster…The 
Disaster Case Manager serves as a primary point of contact, assisting the client in coordinating 
necessary services and resources to address the client‟s complex disaster recovery needs in order 
to re-establish normalcy” (NVOAD, p. 3).  Case management is particularly reliant on agencies 
that can bridge horizontally as well as vertically to be knowledgeable about available help and 
connect people to the help they need.  
Recommendations:   
2a.  Best practices for case management and other strategies should be in place and 
readily available as a contingency. The federal government could identify case 
management agencies in advance and include them in emergency response planning. 
The National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster has outlined DCM best 
practices for: organizational service practice, access to services, personnel 
qualifications, ethical practices, training, managing workloads, confidentiality, 
screening and intake, assessment, recovery planning, monitoring and re-assessment, 
and case closure. 





2b.  FEMA should facilitate the creation of a central clearing house where case managers 
can access information on both local and federal assistance programs and services. 
Rationale:  The service delivery challenges may have prevented some from receiving consistent 
help because of lack of understanding of multiple agencies‟ roles and responsibilities.  Service 
providers lacked a central repository of information that would help them guide clients through 
the confusing array of local and federal assistance programs and services.  
3.  Bureaucratic Constraints to Getting People the Help They Need 
Issue:  Case managers faced challenges in meeting client needs due to a lack of discretionary 
funds that could be used for direct assistance.  Program eligibility requirements were also a 
barrier to providing disaster case management. For example, some funds were restricted to 
victims of a specific hurricane; other guidelines restricted case management services to residents 
of FEMA housing only.   
Recommendations: 
3a.  Access to material resources is essential to post-disaster recovery. Case management 
programs should have discretionary funds for low-cost unmet recovery needs and 
allow local decisions on the use of these funds. 
3b.  Eligibility requirements should continue to be reviewed. This is an ongoing 
discussion about who should receive case management and the ability to meet the 
diverse needs of the population.  
Rationale:  Case management agencies saw the need for direct financial assistance as essential to 
helping clients, yet such assistance was not always available through case management services. 
The inability of the case management system to readily respond to short term needs exacerbated 
challenges in long term recovery.  
4.  Closing the Door before Closing the Deal 
While the need for case management in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was recognized, the timing 
was flawed. The federal government supported disaster case management but breaks in funding 
hindered assistance and created uncertainty. “Breaks in federal funding for disaster case 
management programs initiated after Hurricane Katrina and Rita adversely affected case 
management agencies and may have left victims most in need of assistance without access to 
case management services” (Brown, 2009,  p 7). Some cases were closed not because clients‟ 
needs had been met, but because the program was ending. Inconsistencies in application, 
implementation and outreach to diverse populations were also an issue.  






4a.  Consistent ongoing case transfer protocols should be developed and coordinated with 
adequate program operating periods. 
Rationale:  Some cases were closed not because clients‟ needs had been met, but because the 
program was ending. 
5.  Coordination Challenges Hindered Assistance 
Lack of coordination may have resulted in some victims not receiving case management and 
others receiving services from multiple agencies. “In communities wherein multiple 
organizations provide disaster case management and supportive recovery services, technical 
systems should be used to reduce duplicative case management efforts, and to document and 
facilitate coordination” (NVOAD, 2009, p 6). 
Recommendation: 
5a. Federal partners must formalize a structure and process for working together. 
Specifically, a single federal model for case management should be established that 
is clearly defined, comprehensive, responsive to local conditions, accountable and 
fully and appropriately funded.   Yet, this model must also include defined strategies 
for local involvement. 
Rationale:  As the government had difficulty in meeting the needs of those in the catastrophe, 
other agencies (including local, national, and international NGOs) attempted to meet those needs.  
The confusion about who qualified for what program and how to obtain that information was 
staggering. That being said, the federal model must allow for a local element in order to best 
utilize regionally specific knowledge. “The notion of the need for local elements challenges the 
notion of creating a single, federal approach to disaster case management and suggests that 
federal plans be structured as templates that can be modified by community case managers who 
understand local conditions and demands” (Children‟s Health Fund, 2009, p 11). 
6.  Working in a Context of Overwhelming Need with Limited Capacity 
Issue:  Agencies involved in case management experienced a range of service delivery 
challenges. “The Coordinated Assistance Network is the national database used to coordinate 
and manage service delivery for disaster relief organizations, including KAT” (GAO, July 2009, 
p 16). Several problems arose while using and implementing the CAN database. There was 
inconsistency across agencies in how and which data fields were completed. Many fields were 
left blank. Also because the network was not federally funded, FEMA had no authority over it. 
CAN has since been improved. In the future, funding and staffing are needed to meet data entry 
demands. 





Several sources noted the high staff turnover among case managers. This workforce problem 
created great instability as clients didn‟t know the name of their current case manager. KAT 
reported a 100% turnover of case managers. Large caseloads were barriers to meeting client 
needs. Most sources recommend caseloads be between 25 and 35. The GNODRP evaluation 
states that KAT case managers averaged 81 cases with some having as many as 300 cases. 
GNODRP said case managers agreed caseloads should be kept between 8 and 11 cases. “Case 
manager turnover has been suggested as one of the elements slowing the system down, and there 
have been serious morale issues amongst caseworkers that seem to have also impacted the speed 
at which the system is moving. Some of this stems from the fact that caseloads are too 
large…some of it has to do with case manager frustration with systems they feel have not been 
built to meet the needs of their clients” (Olson, 2007, p. 9). 
Recommendations: 
6a.  Develop federal policies which limit the staff to case ratio for post-disaster case 
management services to ensure caseloads are manageable.  
6b.  Clearly define all roles and responsibilities for case management and accompany 
with consistent training and technical assistance, building on the strengths of local 
agencies that have expertise in case management in an area.  
Rationale: The population that was already vulnerable prior to Hurricane Katrina experienced 
greater barriers after the disaster in terms of lack of housing, employment, daycare, 
transportation, and physical and mental health care. 
Mental Health 
The psychological impacts of disaster include a broad range of symptoms ranging from simple 
short-term reactions to serious post traumatic stress disorder.  “The longer-term adverse health 
effects of the disaster can be expected to be substantial and require follow-up assessments to 
determine the need for mental health care services” (Weisler, Barbee, and Townsend, 2006, p. 
586). Data is emerging slowly about the long-term effects of the recovery from catastrophe, and 
much of this literature is based on disasters. It is important to note that in a catastrophe, social 
support gained through interactions with community institutions such as family, neighborhoods, 
and faith based organizations are greatly diminished.   
1.  Finding and Keeping Resources for Mental Health in All Stages of a Catastrophe 
 Issue:  The issues in funding for long term mental health care are problematic, in part because it 
is not clear what the long term effects of recovery are in a community, especially a community 
with an already at risk population. For example, the Stafford Act mandates that funding for 
SAMHSA mental health treatment only be used for crisis management, not for continuing 
treatment. “It has become clear in the wake of Katrina and Rita that the Stafford Act fails to fully 





address an event of catastrophic magnitude, inadequately providing for mental health services for 
displaced victims” (Boyle, 2007, p. 8).  
Recommendations: 
1a.   Amend the Stafford Act to allow states the financial flexibility to allocate funds for 
continuing treatment of individuals beyond immediate crisis management after a 
catastrophe. 
1b.  Create emergency provisions in Medicaid that provide flexibility to simplify the rules 
and extend Medicaid coverage with federal financing in crisis situations.  
Rationale:  SAMSHA, Medicaid and other funding was confined to certain aspects of the 
disaster, so that long term outreach and counseling were still difficult to provide. 
2.  Defining an Effective Mental Health System 
Before Hurricane Katrina, the mental health system in Louisiana needed additional support. “In 
Louisiana, the pre-hurricane mental health infrastructure was overcommitted and inadequate to 
meet the needs of all those with serious mental illness. The hurricanes only exacerbated existing 
problems by destroying infrastructure, reducing the mental health workforce and creating a new 
population of people in desperate need of mental health services” (Boyle, 2009, p. 7).   
Recommendations: 
2a.  Create provisions within the Stafford Act for catastrophic disasters that allow for 
longer term outpatient treatment of conditions clearly related to the exposure and 
recovery issues associated with the catastrophic event. 
2b.  Changes should include both documented procedures and designated personnel. 
“Written mental health response plans may help to ensure knowledge transfer from 
one event to another and from one person to another. Plans should include a 
designated disaster mental health coordinator with a clear job description, explicit 
mechanisms to build capacity by developing collaborative relationships with key 
agencies, and communication venues” (Elrod, Hamblen, and Norris, 2006, p. 168).  
2c.  Develop additional training that could be accessed in a variety of ways. During the 
event, states should be provided with a list of trainers that have knowledge of the 
event and area. (Elrod, Hamdlen, and Norris 2006). 
Rationale:  The reaction to Hurricane Katrina and the recovery created long term stress that goes 
beyond the stress of a disaster.  Vulnerable populations, especially families with children, face a 
myriad of social stressors that may persist during the long-term recovery phase. 
 







3.  Linking Mental Health Recovery into other Recovery and Social Service Efforts 
Many of the mental health services before Katrina were not well-coordinated within the 
community. During recovery, mental health services need to be linked into more of the fabric of 
the wider social service network. Mental health providers recognize that the sheer size and scope 
of disasters demand collaboration between responding and supporting agencies.  
Recommendations: 
3a.  Facilitate network development and referral protocols among mental health agencies 
and other social service agencies before the event. 
3b:  Collaboration must be implemented before the event.  
3c.  Mental health providers need to develop ways to strategize to track clients so that 
patients can be supported across agencies to ensure continuity of care, public safety, 
and to prevent a disconnection from the other needed post disaster services.  
Rationale:  Attempting to collaborate during a catastrophe was too late and too difficult. The 
protocols of each individual agency were often difficult to coordinate with those of the other 
agencies. 
Non-Profits, Foundations and ‘Help’ 
In the midst of the inability by the federal and state governments to respond in the days and now 
years after Katrina, non-governmental and faith based agencies have attempted to fill the void. 
Non-governmental organizations were a critical part of New Orleans prior to the flooding. New 
Orleans was home to a variety of social service and grassroots organizations that were both 
secular and faith-based. Before Hurricane Katrina, the congregations and service organizations 
represented a source of community, neighborhood strength, and employment.    As nearly 80 
percent of the city flooded, many of these non-profits also suffered physical damage. 
After Katrina, a broad range of NGOs were engaged.  National foundations such as such Ford, 
Rockefeller, A. E. Casey, and W.K. Kellogg began making substantial donations to the Gulf 
Coast, an area that had not been a significant focus of their programming portfolio prior to the 
storm. Some international NGOs, which traditionally work in disaster response in the developing 
world, also offered their assistance. In addition, traditional national disaster relief agencies were 
heavily engaged after the storm including the American Red Cross, United Methodist, Lutherans 
Disaster Corp, Mennonites, and Salvation Army.  Lastly, other groups emerged to play a role in 
the response and recovery.   





1.  Government Remains Ambivalent about the Integration of NGO’s in a 
Coordinated Response to Disasters 
Issue:  The relationship between government at all levels and non-profits is not clear. While there 
is a formalized structure in local and national VOADs, there are still gaps in coordination and 
ultimately in service provision. Both national and international relief agencies continue to 
fragment services, creating silos that may not work in the immediate response and recovery. 
NGO roles have only begun to be formalized or integrated into local and state planning and 
recovery efforts. In addition, new ways of thinking about and managing disaster challenge the 
distinctions between relief and development.  
Recommendations: 
1a.  Further clarify the role of NGOs as part of coordinated governmental response to 
catastrophic disasters in the Stafford Act. 
1b.  Identify roles that appreciate and reflect the inherent strengths and limitations of 
NGOs and are accompanied by provisions for integrated planning and capacity 
building to ensure these roles can be fully executed. 
1c.  The relationships among federal, state, and local government agencies need to be 
built during non-disaster time periods, not as the disaster occurs.  The federal 
government should take the lead in establishing connections and determining 
capacity.   
1d.  Pre-existing relationships with non-profits could result in already approved contracts 
to provide a variety of services before a disaster.  These contracts could delineate 
specific roles and responsibilities of the agency during the disaster. 
1e.  Define the services to be provided by NGOs (e.g., case management) along with the 
system for financing and reimbursement in the Stafford Act and supporting 
legislation. 
Rationale:  Because catastrophic disasters that overwhelm the resources and capacity of local, 
state, and federal government are infrequent, the capacity for broad scale inclusion of other 
organizations such as local, national and international NGOs has not been adequately developed.   





2.  Advocacy is a Critical Element for the Individuals and Families to Negotiate 
Their Recovery 
Advocacy is a critical elemental for the individuals and families to negotiate their 
recovery. Many of the non-profits and foundations did not provide resources on behalf of 
individuals and families.   
Recommendations: 
2a.  Recognize the importance of advocacy organizations in representing the voices of 
vulnerable populations and support their inclusion in relief and recovery planning 
and decision making forums. 
2b.  Identify and support organizations that have existing expertise and legitimacy as 
advocates of vulnerable populations. 
Rationale:  Because of multiple needs, individuals and families needed advocates to help them 
through the complicated maze of available resources.  
3.  Knowledge about Disasters 
Issue:  Foundations and national non-profits have the ability to draw national and international 
attention to the disaster.  However, many of these groups do not have the knowledge about 
disaster, especially in regards to recovery that will allow them to initialize best practice in their 
funding service provision.  Even national disaster relief agencies did not have programming and 
protocol in place for a catastrophe.  
Recommendations: 
3a.   Because vulnerable areas are waiting for the next storm, government programs, 
national non-profits and foundations should work with local agencies to provide a set 
of programs that will be able to bridge the gap between normal times and those 
during a disaster. 
3b.  Provide technical assistance in needs assessment and integrated planning to assist 
with social, cultural, and structural reconstruction.  Create forums for social justice 
issues to be addressed within the reconstruction process. 
Rationale:  Recovery from a catastrophe has a different trajectory than recovery from 
disasters.   Rebuilding a community after a catastrophic disaster requires unique expertise 
that many NGOs and local government agencies likely lack. A great deal of funding was 
designated for immediate relief, but funds for recovery are not so available.  





4.  To Whom and How To Give in a Catastrophe. 
Issue:  With so many different types of groups involved in providing assistance, funders and 
organizations were often „stepping over each other.‟  Further, as funders struggled to find „who 
to fund‟, the knowledge that funders relied on often came from a few sources.   
Recommendations: 
4a.  Evaluate local connections to national funders.  Use local research and knowledge to 
understand the role of gatekeepers in the community. Foundations need to have 
multiple links on the ground in vulnerable areas before a major disaster.  These links 
can provide valuable information about what who is actively working after a disaster 
and will also keep foundations in touch with local needs. 
4b.   Identify and build the capacity of „bridging‟ organizations that will be in the position 
to link local level efforts to state and national resources.  Capacity building efforts of 
these organizations should focus on 1) building vertical linkages to state and national 
agencies and NGOs; 2) building horizontal linkages to local government and NGOs, 
and 3) establishing the administrative infrastructure to facilitate coordination and 
comprehensive service coverage via these linkages.     
4c.  Build links between national disaster agencies and local non-profits. Foundations 
could fund positions that link a local non profits agency with national disaster non-
profits. These ongoing positions will provide a continuing source of local 
knowledge.  
Rationale:  Too often, the funders found themselves “in a hurry” to do something and funding 
was channeled through their existing – and often sparse – networks of local NGOs.  Because 
these service delivery networks had structural holes, assistance was not adequately distributed.   
5.  Conflicting Role of Non-Profits. 
Issue:  Growing expectations for nonprofits and NGOs to assist and even play a leadership role 
in disaster response must be balanced against their own mission.  Many non-profits stepped out 
of their mandates and missions during Hurricane Katrina and recovery.  
Recommendation: 
5a.  Initiate research that develops the roles of non-profits in future catastrophes.    
Rationale:  The lessons from the response to Hurricane Katrina show the flexibility and capacity 
of non-profits and foundations to respond to such events, yet the tension to rely upon these 
agencies in lieu of government help is an important caution. 






 Boyle, Kim. 2007. “Testimony of Kim Boyle Health Care Committee Chairwoman of the 
Louisiana      Recovery Authority before the U.S. Senate Ad Hoc Subcommittee on 
Disaster Recovery.” 
 Brown, Kay E. 2009. “Disaster Assistance: Improvements in Providing Federal Disaster 
Case Management Services Could Help Agencies Better Assist Victims.” United States 
Government Accountability Office. 
 “Disaster Assistance: Greater Coordination and an Evaluation of Programs‟ Outcomes 
Could Improve Disaster Case Management.” 2009. United States Government 
Accountability Office. 
 Elrod, Carrie, Jessica Hamblin, and Fran Norris. 2006. “Challenges in Implementing 
Disaster Mental Health Programs: State Program Directors‟ Perspectives.” The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604:152-169. 
 Guma, Amanda. 2009. “Testimony of Amanda Guma Human Services policy Director 
Louisiana Recovery Authority before the Senate Homeland Security Committee 
Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery.” 
 “National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster: Disaster Case management 
Standards.” 2009. Retrieved March 12, 2010 www.nvoad.org/.../Case 
Management/tabid/87/Default.aspx 
 Olson, Laura. 2007. “Performance Evaluation and Recommendations for the Greater 
New Orleans Disaster Recovery Partnership GNODRP and the Long-term Recovery 
Committees.” The George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk 
Management. 
 Person, Cheryl and Elizabeth J. Fuller. 2007. “Disaster Care for Psychiatric Disabilities: 
Recommendations for Policy Change.” Journal of Disability Policy Studies 17:238-248. 
 Phillips, Brenda. 2009. Disaster Recovery. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, Taylor and 
Francis Group. 
 “Reforming Disaster Case Management: National Lessons from Louisiana.” 2009. Report 
and Recommendations from Disaster Case Management in Louisiana: A Roundtable on 
Recovery from Hurricane Katrina, Rita, Gustav and Ike. Children‟s Health Fund. 
 Weisler, Richard H., MD, James G. Barbee IV, MD and Mark H. Townsend, MD. 2006. 
“Mental Health and Recovery in the Gulf Coast After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 296:585-588. 
 
 
 
